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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
INFANTs-PRocEnINGS AS TO
QurSHMENT TO PRIVATE

Cian

CUSTODY-REPUDIATION

OF

RELIN-

AGENciEs.-Plaintiff, State Depart-

ment of Public Assistance, entered into a written agreement with
defendant whereby defendant agreed to accept custody for foster
care of children placed through the Department of Public Assistance. Defendant agreed to give plaintiff not less than two weeks'
notice if defendant decided to return the infants to plaintiff. Defendant also consented to cooperate in carrying out any change in
plans regarding the child and agreed that the infant placed in home
of defendant was not available to defendant for adoption. Approximately six weeks later an unmarried mother of a newly born child
legally relinquished the custody of her child to the plaintiff who,
three weeks later, delivered the baby to defendant in accordance
with their agreement. Several months later defendant and the
mother of the infant appeared at the office of plaintiff and attempted
to surrender the child, but plaintiff refused since sufficient notice had
not been given under terms of the agreement between plaintiff and
defendant. Thereafter the mother, by an executed and acknowledged
instrument attempted to give her consent to the adoption of the
child by defendant. Plaintiff brought this habeas corpus proceeding
to recover custody of the infant from defendant. Defendant contended that the mother's relinquishment to defendant is in effect a
repudiation of the prior relinquishment of such custody to plaintiff
and in substantial compliance with the pertinent provisions of W.
VA. CODE c. 49, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1955). This statute deals with
the regulation of private institutions and organizations licensed as
child welfare agencies and provides that "an unwed mother may
repudiate a relinquishment of her child within one hundred and
twenty days from day of such relinquishment by a written and
acknowledged notice and statement to said child welfare agency
to such effect." Held, that the provision of the statute relating to
repudiation of relinquishment of custody of the infant by an unwed
mother applied only where the original relinquishment bad been
made to a licensed child welfare agency and not where such relinquishment was made to the State Department of Public Assistance.
Writ awarded. State Department of Public Assistance v. Pettrey,
92 S.E.2d 917 (W. Va. 1956).
This case is noteworthy because it points out the distinction
drawn by the legislature between the limitations placed on repudiation of relinquishment proceedings as to private child welfare

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1956

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 14

ABSTRACTS
agencies and the State Department of Public Assistance. The holding stands as a warning that our statutory rules for repudiation of
relinquishment of custody do not apply to relinquishments made
to the Department of Public Assistance. Query as to whether and
why the State Department of Public Assistance should be given
such an advantage.
T. E. P.

P-YsICiANs AN SURGEONs-CiiROPODIST NOT A DULY LICENsED
PHYsICIAN WmI-N MEANING OF Tim STATurE.-This was a declaratory judgment proceeding. Plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation operated a medical service plan. Under its plan plaintiff agreed to pay a
certain percentage of medical expenses incurred by its subscribers.
Defendants, who were subscribers, received treatment from practicing chiropodists and submitted bills for the payment of such treatment to plaintiff which it refused to pay. Plaintiff claimed that a
chiropodist is not a duly licensed physician within the meaning of
the applicable statute and that treatment by a chiropodist is not
within the scope of the medical service plan operated by plaintiff.
The circuit court held that a duly licensed chiropodist was eligible
to participate in plaintiff's plan and found plaintiff obligated to-pay
the bills of defendant. Thereafter the question was certified to this
court. Held, that a duly licensed practitioner of chiropody is not a
duly licensed "physician" within the meaning of the statute relating
to hospital and medical service plans. The court reasoned that a
duly licensed physician and surgeon, within the scope of the broad
field in which he is authorized to practice as defined by the statute
may, of course, engage in the practice of chiropody. But a duly
licensed chiropodist may not practice medicine and surgery except
within the limit expressly imposed by the statute. This does not go
so far as to permit a chiropodist to be considered a duly licensed
physician. W. VA. CoDE c. 30, art. 3, § 2; art. 11, § 2 (Michie 1955).
The court went on to state that a medical service corporation is
authorized to contract with the public and duly licensed physicians
only for such medical and surgical care as may be furnished by duly
licensed physicians and it is proper to exclude from such contracts
any charge made by a duly licensed chiropodist for treatment which
he has furnished to any subscriber of such corporation. Reversed.
Medical Care v. Chiropody Ass'n of West Virginia, 93 S.E.2d 38
(W. Va. 1956).
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The instant decision in effect spells out that chiropody is not
equivalent to the practice of medicine and surgery, thereby following the generally accepted view in this country. 41 Am. Jun.,
Physicians and Surgeons § 29 (1942). This view is further supported by Dr. G. H. Follansbee in a report to the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association in 1939, cited by the
court, in which he referred to chiropody as "a hand maiden to
medical practice in a limited field considered not important enough
for a doctor of medicine to attend." 93 S.E.2d at 42.
For a discussion of the general subject of the regulation of
chiropody see Annot., 33 A.L.R. 841 (1924).
T. E. P.
VENuE-PRocEDurAL

RlATRm

STATUTES TREAT=D AS RULES OF TM

THw

JUPSDICnrONAL-VENUE
COURT.-A collision occurred

between a motor vehicle owned by a corporation and an automobile
owned and operated by one Raymond Ellis. The collision took place
about March 2, 1955, in Mason County, West Virginia. As a result
of this collision Ellis instituted an action against the corporation in
the common pleas court of Kanawha County on August 18, 1955.
Ellis is a resident of Putnam County. On the first of October, 1955,
the corporation instituted an action against Ellis in Mason County.
Original and an alias summons were issued by the clerk of circuit
court of Mason County, but Ellis was not to be found in that county.
Thereafter a pluries summons was issued and served on Ellis in
Putnam County. On the calling of the docket of the common pleas
court of Kanawha County the judge, having been informed of the
alleged pendency of an action in Mason County circuit court, overruled a motion to have the action pending in Kanawha County
transferred to Mason County circuit court. A writ of mandamus was
awarded by the Supreme Court of Appeals, requiring the common
pleas court of Kanawha County to transfer the case to the circuit
court of Mason County.
It was contended in the mandamus proceeding that under a rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals the action should
be transferred to the circuit court of Mason County and there be
consolidated and tried with the litigation therein instituted involving
theaccident. 121 W. VA. xxiii, §§ 1(a), (c) (1940). The court held
the rule is valid; that venue is procedural and the statutes relating
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thereto are so treated. The majority of the court felt that denial of
application of the rule to the facts would seem to emasculate the rule.
Two judges dissented vigorously, arguing that the circuit court
of Mason County did not have jurisdiction over Ellis since he was
not properly served in order to give the court venue over the action
as required by statute. W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1955).
The dissent felt that the rule applied by the majority was valid if
properly applied, but felt such was not the case here, preferring
emasculation of the rule instead of giving it the effect of contravening and superseding express provisions of valid statutory law.
State v. Davis, 93 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1956) (3-2 decision).
As the court was aware, it is stated in one of the leading legal
encyclopedias that "while there are holdings under certain venue
statutes that their requirements are jurisdictional, by the weight
of authority, and by express provisions in some judisdictions, statutes
with respect to venue are merely procedural and not jurisdictional
in the strict sense." 92 C.J.S., Venue § 75 (1955). West Virginia,
therefore, under the ruling in the instant case, seems to follow the
weight of authority.
T. E. P.
Woiixlm's COmTPsATIoN-INjtmY BY Co-EMTLoYEE--ImiuNITY OF EMPLOYER EXTENDED To Tma PARTY.-This was an action

for the recovery of damages alleged to have resulted from the negligence of defendant in the operation of an automobile in which plaintiff, at the time of the injury, was riding as an invited guest. Plaintiff and defendant were employed by the same company and at the
time of the accident were on company business. Both parties were
protected by the workmen's compensation law of West Virginia.
Plaintiff was awarded compensation and received payments for his
injuries. Defendant contended that by virtue of the laws of West
Virginia the employer's immunity from liability should be extended
to him. W. VA. CODE c. 28, art. 2, § 6(a) (Michie 1955). It was
argued by the plaintiff that since being employed as a branch
manager he was not an employee within the meaning of the compensation statutes and, therefore, defendant's immunity did not
prevent this action. Plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of this
statute, claiming it to be violative of section thirty of article VI of the
state constitution since the purpose of the act was not adequately
covered in the title, and also argued that the section was violative
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of the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
Held, that plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of the
workmen's compensation statute, thereby reaffirming the view
adopted in a prior case [West Virginia Coal & Coke Corp. v. Commissioner, 116 W. Va. 701, 182 S.E. 826 (1935)] that whether or not
a corporation representative is a "manager" must be determined
upon the facts presented. Crawford v. Parsons, 92 S.E.2d 913 (W.
Va. 1956).
The court also ruled that W. VA. CODE: c. 28, art. 2, § 6 (a) was
not violative of any provision of either the state or federal constitutions stating that a statute relating to immunity from liability of
officers, managers, agents, representatives and employees of employers electing to subscribe to workmen's compensation fund is not
violative of due process. Although it does deprive an injured employee of his common law action to sue a tort-feasor for his negligent
conduct, it is not arbitrary and capricious legislation.
Thus, West Virginia holds constitutional a statute extending to
a third party the immunity of the employer from liability under the
workmen's compensation law, so long as that third party is an employee within the meaning of the compensation law.
For an explanation as to why the employer's immunity from
liability under the compensation act should be extended to a coemployee in this situation, see 2 LAwsoN, Womwni's COMPENSATiON
§ 72.20 (1952).
T. E. P.
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